In a case that explores the legislative intent behind Alabama’s criminal code and the necessary behavior to assert Miranda rights, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals recently heard the appeal of Terrell Maurice Watts v. State of Alabama, No. CR-2023-0820, 2024 WL 4312584 (Ala. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2024). This case, arising from the Jefferson Circuit Court in Jefferson County, defines law enforcement’s burden when questioning a suspect without counsel present, clarifying the unambiguous assertion requirement to invoke Miranda rights.

On the day of the homicide, Marcus Nevel and Anthony Grayson were driving around while drinking and doing crack cocaine. While engaged in these activities, Nevel and Grayson encountered Terrell Maurice Watts, who asked them to drive him somewhere to buy drugs. The three men purchased and consumed more crack cocaine, after which Watts wanted to purchase even more cocaine with his remaining money. Nevel drove the group to an apartment complex and exited the vehicle. Unable to reach his contact, Nevel returned to the car and gave the money back to Watts. As Nevel was starting the car, he heard a shot and saw a flash in the backseat of the vehicle as Grayson “jerked.” Watts was the only other person in the car, so, assuming Watts was the shooter, Nevel drove all three men to a nearby convenience store to call emergency services. Watts fled the scene.

Watts was convicted of murder, made capital because it involved the use of a deadly weapon fired or otherwise used within or from a vehicle under §13A-5-40(a)(18) of the Alabama Code. §13A-5-40 provides a list of capital offenses recognized in Alabama, with §13A-5-40(a)(18) specifically including “murder committed by or through the use of a deadly weapon fired or otherwise used within or from a vehicle.”

On appeal, Watts raised two main issues—one centered around the interpretation and legislative intent behind §13A-5-40(a)(18), and one regarding Watts’s ambiguous evocation of his Miranda rights. To the first point, Watts argued that §13A-5-40(a)(18) was directed at drive-by shootings and was not applicable to the facts of the case against him. To support this interpretation, Watts cited the joint resolution of the Alabama Legislature, which supported this intention. The Court, however, found that the plain language of the statute encompassed the charges against Watts, and post-enactment legislative intent is not sufficient to override the plain language.

Additionally, Watts argued that his statements to police should have been suppressed because he did not waive his Miranda rights. When Watts was initially apprehended, the detectives interviewing him provided a waiver-of-rights form, which Watts did not sign. The detectives then asked Watts whether he wished to make a statement without his attorney present. Watts mumbled, responding “Nah, all I did is come down here and ask to talk,” and began answering the detectives’ questioning. From this interaction, Watts developed two theories as to why the statement should be suppressed—first, that saying “nah” was a clear assertion of his Miranda rights, and second, if the assertion was unclear, that the ambiguity required the police officers to actively clarify whether Watts was asserting his Miranda rights. On appeal, Watts pursued the second theory, asserting that the detectives had a duty to cease questioning and clarify the ambiguity.

To clarify the requirements to assert Miranda rights, the Court referenced two prior cases: Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), and Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). In Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the suspect must unambiguously request counsel to assert his or her Miranda rights. Davis also provides a standard for whether a statement is ambiguous, basing the determination on what a reasonable police officer under the circumstances would understand. In Berghuis, the U.S. Supreme Court again held that an invocation of Miranda rights must be unambiguous, even when the defendant declined to sign a waiver-of-rights form. Applying these prior holdings to the facts of Watts’s case, the Court found that the detectives had no duty to clarify the ambiguity of Watts’s response, and Watts had not clearly asserted his Miranda rights.

Additionally, Watts argued that even if he had waived his rights, it could not have been voluntary due to his intoxication and sleep deprivation, but he had failed to preserve the argument for appeal. Despite the lack of preservation, the Court still addressed the argument, noting that Watts was coherent and animated, and the statement was made several hours after Watts had ingested cocaine. Further, the intoxication was not sufficient to reduce Watts’s charges to reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide, as he clearly recalled the events and details from the night of the homicide. After consideration of each of Watts’s arguments, the Court affirmed his conviction for capital murder, finding no error in the trial court’s denial of his motions.

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